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> Regardless, this is an example of why cloud communication (and ticketing and database off-loading [see MongoHQ] and...) systems probably won't ever become commonplace in most of the government space and the finance and health sectors.

I agree. We might not like rolling out our own instances, but it prevents hackers from being able to grab ALL THE DATA in one fell swoop. It really amazes me that some EHR systems have gone the cloud route.



It's heartening to me. I've seen small practices with atrocious IT security. No WAY is self-hosted (for the thousands of small practices with maybe a couple of clueless help-desk types) even a billionth as secure as a professionally secured cloud service.

Also, "cloud" for services like this means "your own private instance of the software running in a private VM in our datacenter" not "your own customer_id in a shared database."


OTOH, if you're small, you are not as interesting a target as a huge cloud provider that hosts everyone. Which means, while small practice's security should be good, it doesn't actually have to be as good as the big cloud behemoth.

It's why your gmail account is more likely to get hacked than my piddly self hosted imap server. Google's network security is unarguably better than mine, but you are never going to social engineer your way into changing my password, which is actually doable with gmail (happened to my sister in law).


Also, it is far easier to harden one or two hosts than entire farm of different devices.


If you had a vulnerability in an EHR that was run locally at many different hospitals a hacker would still have to target every single hospital that uses it and wade their way through a bunch of different custom configurations. It's not as juicy a target as a cloud-based system where a single vulnerability can get ALL the data of ALL the hospitals EVER in one location. (Like the Anthem hack.) I agree that most locally run systems are more vulnerable than the professional cloud based services. But cloud services are more exposed to attack and are a more profitable target for hackers due to their size.

I think you have to assume that you're going to be hacked if you're a big enough target. You don't know what you don't know about your vulnerabilities. The better question is how you're going to design your data and platform to minimize the damage a major hack can do.


If you're small, cloud may be better, but if you're large it often isn't.


It's true that large will have more resources to do security right, but also they become a bigger target. If a small company self-hosts, they are less likely to be targeted than if they are a customer of a big cloud service where hackers might incidentally steal their data because it's there with thousands of other accounts.

I guess what I'm saying is that regardless of who you are, there is no easily discernible best practice playbook, just a sea of tradeoffs generally made by people with a woefully inadequate grasp of the risks involved. Heck, even the best security people are at a disadvantage in the asymmetrical battle of infosec.


Large does not mean you have better security, as I understand. (see Sony)


Yes, but you at least have the money and resources available to have better security. If you choose to squander those resources and not dedicate a large enough budget to your security department, that's your fault.

Small companies typically can't afford competent and professional security analysts, engineers, penetration testers, and auditors.




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